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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found Robert Johnson Kinney guilty of one count of
felony sexual battery of a minor.  On appeal, Mr. Kinney asserts the district court erred when it
failed to dismiss the charge against him on proportionality grounds, because the restrictions
imposed on Mr. Kinney by the Idaho sex offender registration statutes constitute cruel and
unusual punishment.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Kinney by Information with one count of sexual battery of a
minor, felony, I.C. § 18-1508A.  (R., pp.35-36.)  Specifically, the Information charged
Mr. Kinney with engaging in genital to genital contact and/or sexual intercourse with B.P.B., a
sixteen-year-old minor, where Mr. Kinney was over the age of eighteen and at least five years
older than B.P.B.  (R., pp.35-36.)  Mr. Kinney was twenty-five years old at the time of the
alleged sexual contact.  (See R., p.35.)  He entered a not guilty plea.  (R., p.41.)
Mr. Kinney later filed a Motion to Dismiss on Proportionality Grounds.  (R., pp.68-75.)
The  motion  asked  the  district  court  to  dismiss  the  charge  of  sexual  battery.   (R.,  p.68.)
Mr. Kinney asserted that, alongside “possible life imprisonment or community supervision, he
was facing a “set of laws creating a sex offender registry [he] would be required to comply with
for at least ten years.”  (See R., p.69.)  Mr. Kinney described some of the requirements imposed
by that set of laws, the Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right-to-
Know Act,  I.C. §§ 18-8301 to 18-8331 (the Act or SORA).  (R., pp.69-70.)
Mr. Kinney acknowledged the Idaho Supreme Court had previously held in State v.
Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 85-86 (2007), that the sex offender registry was not punishment.  (R., p.71.)
2He asserted the decision in Joslin was premised on the Idaho Supreme Court’s prior decision in
Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96 (1999).  (R., p.71.)  Mr. Kinney asserted that in Ray, “the Supreme
Court was not faced with the pervasive surveillance provided for here, nor the speech restriction
the statute contemplates, but rather simply a question of the stigma created by registration.”  (See
R., pp.71-72.)  Further, “[t]here is no doubt that under the laws as they now are the state seeks to
deprive the defendant of his liberties.  The requirements for those registered as adult sex
offenders are similar if not worse than those imposed on parolees and probationers.”  (R., p.72
(citation  omitted).)   Mr.  Kinney  therefore  asserted,  “the  ruling  in Joslin was manifestly wrong
and should be overruled.”  (R., p.72.)
Turning to the test for cruel and unusual punishment, Mr. Kinney asserted, “[o]nly
eighteen of the fifty states would call what is written in the information in this case a crime.”
(See R., p.72.)  Mr. Kinney also quoted the letter from the special concurrence in Joslin, where
seven members of the jury wrote the district court about their concerns regarding the sentence
and sex offender status the defendant would receive in that case.  (R., p.73 (quoting Joslin, 145
Idaho at 87 (J. Jones, J., specially concurring).)
Mr. Kinney further asserted, “[i]n the international community, most European countries
have  their  age  of  consent  set  at  sixteen.”   (R.,  p.73.)   He  asserted,  “it  is  difficult  to  see  how
making the defendant into a felon and a registered sex offender with the accompanying ruin for
his reputation, degradation of his social status, and loss of his liberty can possibl[y] meet any of
the goals of sentencing.”  (R., p.74.)  Additionally, Mr. Kinney asserted:  “Making him a felon is
cruel and unusual.  Forcing him to spend the rest of his life labeled a sex offender and thereby
losing access to employment, housing, and association, is cruel and unusual.”  (R., p.74.)  Thus,
Mr. Kinney asserted, “[t]his Court should find that these statutes violate the ban on Cruel and
3Unusual Punishment of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I §§ 1, 6 of the Idaho Constitution.”  (R., p.75.)
Mr. Kinney also filed a Motion to Dismiss on Equal Protection Grounds (R., pp.44-55),
and a Motion to Dismiss on Substantive Due Process Grounds (R., pp.56-67.)
The  district  court  conducted  a  hearing  on  Mr.  Kinney’s  three  motions  to  dismiss.   (See
R., pp.76-77.)  Regarding the motion to dismiss on proportionality grounds, Mr. Kinney again
recognized Idaho’s courts have held the sex offender registry does not constitute punishment.
(See Tr. July 21, 2016, p.6, Ls.13-25.)  Mr. Kinney asserted he had standing to challenge the sex
offender registry “because it is an automatic sanction in these cases.”  (Tr. July 21, 2016, p.7,
Ls.1-6.)  With respect to the sex offender registry, Mr. Kinney asserted, “[p]erhaps at one point it
was nothing more than peoples’ names on a list somewhere that people could go find versus
what it’s become today, which is a massive number of restrictions on peoples’ lives that are
enforced not only by public opinion but by the law, itself.”  (Tr. July 21, 2016, p.7, Ls.11-16.)
Mr. Kinney asserted, “[a]nd so things have changed quite a bit since the decisions that are cited
to in the briefing.  We just don’t think they should continue to be applicable.”  (Tr. July 21, 2016,
p.7, Ls.16-19.)
Mr.  Kinney  also  asserted,  “[t]he  fact  that  it’s  automatic  rather  than  being  discretionary
with the judge, for example, is something that I think is really abominable in a case such as this
one where you have a man who is being charged with having conduct that wouldn’t be again
sanctionable in . . . a majority of states.”  (Tr. July 21, 2016, p.8, Ls.1-8.)  He asserted, “[a]nd the
Court doesn’t even have the ability to look at the circumstances, you know, look at a
psychosexual evaluation and look at a polygraph and say, ‘Is there any reason to say that for the
4next ten years at least this young man should have to bear this burden?’”  (Tr. July 21, 2016, p.8,
Ls.8-13.)
The district court subsequently entered a Memorandum Decision and Order on
Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss.  (R., pp.78-89.)  The district court determined, “Joslin appears
to be dispositive of Defendant’s claim that Idaho’s Sex Offender Registration statute violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  The Court explained the
registration requirement is not punitive, it is remedial.”  (R., p.81 (citing Joslin, 145 Idaho at 85-
86).)  Additionally, the district court quoted Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822 (2009), where the
Idaho Supreme Court held the legislative intent behind the sex offender registry was “to protect
the public through the dissemination of information,” rather than punishment.  (R., p.86 (quoting
Smith, 146 Idaho at 839).)  The district court also observed, “the United States Supreme Court
upheld a Kansas involuntary commitment requirement for violent sexual offenders on the same
basis, finding that the statute was ‘non-punitive.’”  (R., p.81 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521
U.S. 346 (1997)).)
Thus, the district court determined, “[b]ased on previous decisions of the United States
and  Idaho  Supreme  Courts  Defendant’s  argument  fails.   Idaho’s  Sex  Offender  Registry  is  not
punitive and, therefore, cannot be construed to violate the prohibitions on cruel and unusual
punishment.”  (R., pp.81-82.)  The district court denied Mr. Kinney’s motion to dismiss on
proportionality grounds.  (R., pp.82, 88.)  The district court also denied his motion to dismiss on
equal protection grounds (R., pp.87-88), and his motion to dismiss on substantive due process
grounds (R., pp.84, 88).1
1 On appeal, Mr. Kinney does not challenge the district court’s denials of his motion to dismiss
on equal protection grounds and his motion to dismiss on substantive due process grounds.
5The case proceeded to a jury trial.  (See R., pp.99-110.)  B.P.B. testified during the trial.
(See R., pp.100-01.)  B.P.B. testified she and Mr. Kinney had sexual intercourse on multiple
occasions over a period of about five months.  (See Tr. Aug. 16, 2016, p.68, L.1 – p.69, L.25.)
Coeur d’Alene Police Department Officer Cannon testified that, around three in the
morning one day, he found Mr. Kinney and B.P.B. in a car parked in a hotel parking lot.  (See
Tr. Aug. 16, 2016, p.92, L.25 – p.98, L.20.)  He testified Mr. Kinney initially denied anything
inappropriate had happened between him and B.P.B.  (See Tr. Aug. 16, 2016, p.100, Ls.7-14.)
The officer testified Mr. Kinney consented to a search of his cellphone’s text messages.  (See
Tr. Aug. 16, 2016, p.100, L.15 – p.101, L.4.)  Officer Cannon testified he found text messages
relating to Mr. Kinney and B.P.B. having sexual intercourse. (See Tr. Aug. 16, 2016, p.101, L.5
– p.104, L.4.)  The officer testified Mr. Kinney, upon being confronted with the text messages,
admitted to having sexual intercourse with B.P.B.  (See Tr. Aug. 16, 2016, p.102, L.11 – p.103,
L.4.)
Mr. Kinney elected to not testify in his own defense.  (See Tr. Aug. 17, 2016, p.137, Ls.1-
21.)  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Kinney guilty of sexual battery.
(R., p.111.)
Before  sentencing,  Mr.  Kinney  filed  a  Motion  to  Reconsider  Motion  to  Dismiss  on
Proportionality Grounds.  (R., pp.155-56.)  Mr. Kinney’s first ground for the motion to
reconsider  was  “there  is  a  possibility  that  Motions  to  Dismiss  on  the  grounds  that  a  penalty  is
unconstitutional are not ripe for adjudication until there has been a conviction.”  (R., p.155.)  As
for the second ground, Mr. Kinney asserted, “the Sixth Circuit has recently found that SORA
[Sex Offender Registration Act] as it exists in Michigan in Mich. Comp. Laws § 28.723, et seq.,
is punitive.”  (R., p.155 (citing John Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016)).)
6Mr. Kinney asserted, “Michigan’s SORA is substantially the same as Idaho’s.  This Court should
find the Sixth Circuit persuasive and rule in accord.”  (R., p.155.)  Alternatively, Mr. Kinney
requested the district court “hold I.C. § 18-8306 unconstitutional as it applies to this case and
therefore not order the defendant to register or that his information be collected by law
enforcement or submitted to the Idaho State Police and the central registry.”  (R., pp.155-56.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and
retained jurisdiction.2  (R., pp.173-74.)
After sentencing, the district court conducted a hearing on the motion to reconsider the
motion to dismiss on proportionality grounds.  (See R.,  p.177.)   Mr.  Kinney  asked  the  district
court to rely on the briefing in the motion.  (Tr. Dec. 28, 2016, p.4, Ls.7-25.)  The district court
noted “there might be some, what defense counsel may believe as, persuasive authority; but
there’s no authority that requires the court to change its decision that has been presented to the
court.”  (Tr. Dec. 28, 2016, p.5, Ls.14-18.)  The district court found “nothing new in the motion
brought by the defense in this matter to reconsider its position, and therefore the motion is
denied.”  (Tr. Dec. 28, 2016, p.5, Ls.20-23; see R., p.189-90.)
Mr. Kinney filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment and
Sentence Retaining Jurisdiction.  (R., pp.178-82.)
2 At the sentencing hearing, the district court told Mr. Kinney: “I have no control over the matter
of whether or not you have to register as a sex offender. . . .  I am bound by the law.  We are a
nation  of  laws  and  therefore  that  is  something  you’ll  have  to  do  and  I  have  no  control  over.”
(Tr. Nov. 23, 2016, p.39, L.22 – p.40, L.3.)
7ISSUE
Did the district court err when it failed to dismiss the charge against Mr. Kinney on
proportionality grounds?
8ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Failed To Dismiss The Charge Against Mr. Kinney On
Proportionality Grounds
A. Introduction
Mr. Kinney asserts the district court erred when it failed to dismiss the charge against him
on proportionality grounds.  Contrary to the district court’s determination, Idaho’s SORA
violates the United States and Idaho constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment.  The Act is punitive, and the previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court holding
otherwise are manifestly wrong and should be overturned.  The punishment imposed by the Act
is cruel and unusual, because it is grossly disproportionate to Mr. Kinney’s offense.
B. Standard Of Review
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[b]oth constitutional questions and questions of
statutory interpretation are questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.”
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40 (2010).  “There is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality
of the challenged statute or regulation, and the burden of establishing that the statute or
regulation is unconstitutional rests upon the challengers.” Id.  An appellate court is obligated to
seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality, and should exercise its
judicial power to declare legislative action unconstitutional only in clear cases. Id.
C. Idaho’s SORA Violates The Constitutional Prohibitions Against Cruel And Unusual
Punishment
Mr. Kinney asserts Idaho’s SORA violates the constitutional prohibitions against cruel
and unusual punishment.  The restrictions imposed by the Act constitute punishment, and those
Idaho Supreme Court decisions holding the Act is not punitive are manifestly wrong and should
9be overturned.  The punishment imposed by SORA in this case is grossly disproportionate to
Mr. Kinney’s offense.
The United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution both prohibit cruel and unusual
punishments.  U.S. Const. Art. VIII; Idaho Const. Art. I, § 6.  The Idaho Supreme Court has held
that, under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the test for whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual focuses on whether the punishment is “grossly
disproportionate.” See State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 394 (1992) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 1004-05 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
The Brown Court observed the Court had previously held that, under the Idaho Constitution, “a
criminal sentence is cruel and unusual punishment only when it is out of proportion to the gravity
of the offense committed, and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable people.” Id.
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court held, “[t]his traditional Idaho
constitutional rule focusing on the gravity of the offense is well established and appropriate and
is essentially equivalent to the ‘grossly disproportionate’ test used by Justice Kennedy’s opinion
in Harmelin.” Id.  Thus, based on Idaho Supreme Court precedent, the analysis for the
United States and Idaho constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment appears
to be the same.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[t]o determine whether a sentence is cruel and
unusual, this Court engages in a two-part inquiry.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 486 (2012).
“First, this Court must ‘make a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed to determine whether the sentence leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’”
Id. (quoting Brown, 121 Idaho at 394).  “Where no inference of a gross disproportionality can be
made, ‘there is no necessity to make any further proportionality review.’” Id. (quoting Brown,
10
121 Idaho at 394).  “However, ‘[i]f an inference of such disproportionality is found [the Court]
must conduct a proportionality analysis comparing [the defendant’s] sentence to those imposed
on other defendants for similar offenses.’” Id. (quoting State v. Olivera, 131 Idaho 628, 632
(Ct. App. 1998)).
1. SORA Is Punitive
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Kinney asserts SORA is punitive.  Mr. Kinney
acknowledges the Idaho Supreme Court has previously held the Act is not punitive, but asserts
those decisions are manifestly wrong and should be overturned.
For SORA to come within the purview of the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and
unusual punishments, the restrictions imposed by the Act must constitute punishment.  To
determine whether a sex offender registration law constitutes punishment, a court must first
“ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” See Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).  According to the United States
Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, “[i]f the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment,
that ends the inquiry.  If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and
nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention to deem it civil.” Id. (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted).  Because an appellate court will “ordinarily defer to the legislature’s
stated intent, only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what
has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The Smith v. Doe Court also held that “[w]hether a statutory scheme is civil or criminal is
first of all a question of statutory construction.  We consider the statute’s test and its structure to
11
determine the legislative objective.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Here,
the Idaho Legislature in SORA declared, “this state’s policy is to assist efforts of local law
enforcement agencies to protect communities by requiring sexual offenders to register with local
law enforcement agencies and to make certain information about sexual offenders available to
the public as provided in this chapter.”  I.C. § 18-8302.  Based on the language of Section 18-
8302, the Idaho Supreme Court has held the purpose of the Act is not punitive. Smith v. State,
146 Idaho 822, 839 (2009) (holding the legislative findings in Section 18-8302 “evince the
intention to protect the public through the dissemination of information”); Ray v. State, 133
Idaho 96, 100 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)
(“The purpose of Idaho’s registration statute is not punitive, but remedial.”).
However, with respect to the effects of SORA, the Idaho Supreme Court’s holdings that
the Act is not punitive are manifestly wrong.  The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Joslin, 145
Idaho 75 (2007), held, “[t]he requirement that sexual offenders register does not impose
punishment.” Joslin, 145 Idaho at 86.  The Court in Joslin, based on its prior decision in Ray,
held “‘[t]he purpose of Idaho’s registration statute is not punitive, but remedial.’  It ‘provides an
essential regulatory purpose that assists law enforcement and parents in protecting children and
communities.’” Id. (quoting Ray, 133 Idaho at 100-01).  The Joslin Court held, “[t]herefore, it
cannot constitute the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment under our State Constitution.
Since it is not punishment under Idaho law, it would not constitute the infliction of punishment
under the Constitution of the United States.” Id. (citing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84).
In Ray,  the  Idaho  Supreme Court  also  held,  “Idaho’s  Sexual  Offender  Registration  Act
provides an essential regulatory purpose that assists law enforcement and parents in protecting
children and communities.” Ray, 133 Idaho at 101.  The Ray Court held, “the fact that
12
registration  brings  notoriety  to  a  person  convicted  of  a  sexual  offense  does  prolong  the  stigma
attached to such convictions.  However, the fact of registration is not an additional punishment; it
does not extend a sentence.  Rather, registration provides an information system that assists in
the protection of communities.” Id.
Based in part on Ray, the Idaho Supreme Court in Smith v. State similarly held, “the
imposition of additional registration requirements for offenders deemed VSPs [violent sexual
predators] in Idaho is also non-punitive.” See Smith v. State, 146 Idaho at 839; see also State v.
Gragg, 143 Idaho 74, 78 (Ct. App. 2005) (“Gragg has not shown that the effects of sex offender
registration under the Act are so punitive as to override the legislative intent to create a civil,
regulatory scheme.”).
Mr. Kinney asserts Smith v. State, Joslin, and Ray are manifestly wrong and should be
overturned.   The  rule  of  stare  decisis  dictates  that  an  appellate  court  must  follow  controlling
precedent “unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has been proven over time to be unjust or
unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and
remedy continued injustice.” State v. Humpherys, 134 Idaho 657, 661 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Smith v. State, Joslin, and Ray are manifestly wrong in light of the changes to Idaho’s
SORA enacted after Ray was decided in 1999.  As shown above, the analysis in Smith v. State
and Joslin was heavily indebted to Ray, without really considering any changes to the Act.
However, important changes to the Act made since 1999 include:
· The duty to update registration information now includes a requirement to appear in
person, added in 2011 with the enactment of the new version of I.C. § 18-8309.
See 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 311, § 9.
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· I.C. § 18-8327, a section generally prohibiting sex offender registrants from working
at or being on the premises of day care facilities, was added in 2004. See 2004 Idaho
Sess. Laws, ch. 270, § 1.
· I.C. § 18-8329, which generally prohibits sex offender registrants from being on the
premises of any school building or school grounds, “[k]nowingly loiter[ing] on a
public way within five hundred (500) feet of the property line of school grounds”
when children are present and involved in a school activity, and “[r]esid[ing] within
five hundred (500) feet of the property on which a school is located,” was enacted in
2006. See 2006 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 354, § 1.
· In 2001, public access to information on the sex offender registry under I.C. § 18-
8323, which had been by written request only, shifted to the Internet. See 2001 Idaho
Sess. Laws, ch. 195, § 1.
Mr. Kinney submits that because of these and other changes enacted since 1999, SORA is
now punitive in effect.  The United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe held that, in analyzing
the effects of a statute, “we refer to the seven factors noted in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
[372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)], as a useful framework.” Smith v. Doe,  538  U.S.  at  97.   The
Smith v. Doe Court noted the factors had their origin, in part, from Eighth Amendment cases. Id.
“Because the Mendoza-Martinez factors are designed to apply in various constitutional contexts,
we have said they are neither exhaustive nor dispositive, but are useful guideposts.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
In Mendoza-Martinez,  the  seven  factors  identified  by  the  Court  were:   (1) whether the
sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) whether it has historically been
regarded as a punishment, (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
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(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment, (5) whether the
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it
may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
The Smith v. Doe Court observed, “[t]he factors most relevant to our analysis are
whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and
traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional
aims of punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with
respect to this purpose.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 97.
As Mr. Kinney asserted before the district court, Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th
Cir. 2016), provides persuasive authority for why SORA is now punitive.  In Does #1-5, the
plaintiffs asserted the retroactive application to them of amendments to Michigan’s sex offender
registration act amounted to an ex post facto punishment prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at
698.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s
determination  that  Michigan’s  sex  offender  registration  act  was  not  an  ex  post  facto  law,  and
held the Michigan act imposed punishment. Id. at 705-06.
Looking at the five most-relevant factors identified in Smith v. Doe, the Does #1-5 Court
decided that while the Michigan act “is not identical to any traditional punishments, it meets the
general definition of punishment, has much in common with banishment and public shaming,
and has a number of similarities to parole/probation.” Id. at 703.  The Sixth Circuit then decided
the act imposed direct restraints on personal conduct, and its restrictions were far more onerous
than those the United States Supreme Court had considered in Smith v. Doe. Id. at 703-04.  The
Does #1-5 Court  gave  the  traditional  aims  of  punishment  factor  little  weight,  because  the
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incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence goals of punishment could largely also be described as
civil and regulatory. Id. at 704.
The Sixth Circuit in Does #1-5 then observed, “the record before us provides scant
support for the proposition that [the Michigan act] in fact accomplishes its professed goals.” Id.
at 704.  There was evidence that offense-based public registration had no impact on recidivism,
one statistical analysis concluded laws like the Michigan act actually increased the risk of
recidivism, and the Michigan act made “no provision for individualized assessments of
proclivities or dangerousness.” Id. at 704-05.  The Does #1-5 Court also decided the negative
effects  of  the  Michigan  act  “are  plain  on  the  law’s  face,”  and  “[t]he  punitive  effect  of  these
blanket restrictions thus far exceed even a generous assessment of their salutary effects.” Id.
at 705.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit held the actual effect of the Michigan act was punitive. Id.  The
Does #1-5 Court was careful to note its holding was in agreement with other courts confronting
similar laws. Id. (citing Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077, 1100 (N.H. 2015); State v. Letalien, 985
A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009); Starkey v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Corr., 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013);
Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437 (Ky. 2009); Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1017
(Alaska 2008)).
Here, consideration of the five most-relevant factors identified in Smith v. Doe reveals
that Idaho’s SORA, much like the Michigan act examined by the Sixth Circuit in Does #1-5, is
now punitive.
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a. History And Traditions
On whether SORA inflicts what has been regarded in our history and traditions as
punishment, while the Act “has no direct ancestors in our history and traditions, its restrictions
do meet the general, and widely accepted, definition of punishment offered by legal philosopher
H.L.A. Hart.” See Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 701.  This is because the Act “(1) involves pain or
other consequences typically considered unpleasant; (2) it follows from an offense against legal
rules; (3) it applies to the actual (or supposed) offender; (4) it is intentionally administered by
people other than the offender; and (5) it is imposed and administered by an authority constituted
by a legal system against which the offense was committed.” See id. (citing  H.L.A.  Hart,
Punishment and Responsibility 4-5 (1968)).
Following the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Does #1-5, SORA also “resembles, in some
respects at least, the ancient punishment of banishment.” See id.  This is because “its
geographical restrictions are . . . very burdensome, especially in densely populated areas.” See
id. Namely, the restrictions generally prohibiting registrants being on the premises of any school
building or school grounds, knowingly loitering on a public way within five hundred (500) feet
of the property line of school grounds when children are present and involved in a school
activity, or residing within five hundred (500) feet of the property on which a school is located,
are significant burdens. See I.C. § 18-8329.  Because of these school zone restrictions, sex
offenders “are forced to tailor much of their lives around these school zones, and . . . they often
have great difficulty in finding a place where they may legally live or work.” See Does #1-5,
834 F.3d at 702.3
3 To an extent, the requirements of SORA “also resemble traditional shaming punishments.” See
Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 702.  In Smith v. State,  the  Idaho  Supreme  Court  held  the  statutory
scheme  for  designation  as  a  violent  sexual  predator  (VSP)  under  the  Act  was  constitutionally
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The Act “also resembles the punishment of parole/probation.” See id. at 703.  The United
States Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe held the statute at issue there was ultimately unlike
parole/probation because, unlike parolees, “offenders subject to the Alaska statute are free to
move where they wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision.” See Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. at 101.  In contrast to the statute in Smith v. Doe, and much like the Michigan act
in Does #1-5, registrants under the current form of SORA “are subject to numerous restrictions
on where they can live and work and, much like parolees, they must report in person, rather than
by phone or mail.” See Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 703.  Specifically, the Act restricts where
registrants may live with respect to school zones, I.C. § 18-8329, as well as with respect to
residential dwellings with other registrants, I.C. § 18-8331.  Further, the Act currently prohibits
registrants from working at day care facilities.  I.C. § 18-8327.  As for reporting in person, the
Act requires registrants to appear in person to meet the periodic registration requirement,
infirm, because it did not comport with constitutional standards of procedural due process.
Smith v. State, 146 Idaho at 839-40.  A VSP designation had been based on a determination that
“the offender continues to ‘pose a high risk of committing an offense or engaging in predatory
sexual conduct.’” Id. at 826 (quoting I.C. § 18-8303(15) (2009)).
The Smith v. State Court  described  the  label  of  VSP  as  “a  ‘badge  of  infamy’  that
necessitates due process protections.” Id. at 827.  The Court also noted that while “[n]on-VSP
offenders may petition a court for relief from the duty to register after a period of ten years . . . a
VSP has no right to such relief.  Thus, for an offender designated as a VSP, the scarlet letters are
indelible.” Id.
After Smith v. State, the Idaho Legislature removed the sexual offender classification
board’s authority to designate sex offenders as VSPs. See 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 311, § 13.
However, the Idaho State Police website on SORA currently features a list of twenty-eight VSPs.
Idaho  State  Police,  Idaho  SOR,  List  of  Violent  Sexual  Predators,
https://isp.idaho.gov/sor_id/SOR?form=6&typ=vsp&page=1&sz=1536 (last accessed Sept. 5,
2017).
Further, the Act still provides that an offender designated as a VSP may not petition the
district court for a show cause hearing to determine if the offender should be exempted from the
duty to register as a sexual offender. See I.C. § 18-8310(1).  Thus, at least with respect to those
offenders designated as VSPs, the ignominy under SORA “flows not only from the past offense,
but also from the statute itself.” See Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 703.
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I.C. § 18-8307(5)(c),4 and now also requires them to appear in person if they change their name,
street address or actual address, employment, or student status, I.C. § 18-8309(1).
As with the Michigan act, see Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 703, failure to comply can be
punished by imprisonment under SORA, not unlike a revocation of parole. See I.C. § 18-8311.
Additionally, “while the level of individual supervision is less than is typical of parole or
probation, the basic mechanism and effects have a great deal in common.” See Does #1-5, 834
F.3d at 703.  Thus, the history and tradition factor weighs in favor of SORA being punitive.
See id.
b. Affirmative Disability Or Restraint
On whether SORA imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, the current version of
the Act requires much more than the version of the Act examined in Ray.  As discussed above,
the Act currently regulates “where registrants may live, work, and ‘loiter’.” See Does #1-5, 834
F.3d at 703.  Those restrictions “put significant restraints on how registrants may live their
lives.” See id.  Further, considering registrants must now appear in person for both periodic
registration and status updates, SORA imposes “direct restraints on personal conduct.” See id.
Because the restrictions imposed by the Act are far more onerous than those in the earlier version
of the Act considered by the Idaho Supreme Court in Ray, this factor weighs in favor of the Act
being punitive. See id. at 704 (“[The Michigan act’s] restrictions are again far more onerous than
those considered in [Smith v. Doe], and this factor too therefore weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor.”).
4 The Act has had some form of an in-person annual or periodic registration requirement since its
enactment in 1998. See 1998 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 411, § 2.
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c. Traditional Aims Of Punishment
On  whether  SORA  promotes  the  traditional  aims  of  punishment,  it  appears  the  Act
advances three of the “four objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society,
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3) possibility of rehabilitation, and
(4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.” See also State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568
(Ct. App. 1982) (articulating the four objectives of criminal punishment recognized in Idaho).
Akin to the Michigan act in Does #1-5, see 834 F.3d at 704, the Act seeks to incapacitate
sex offenders by keeping them away from opportunities to reoffend. See I.C. § 18-8302 (finding
by the Idaho Legislature that public access to certain information about sex offenders “assists the
community in being observant of convicted sexual offenders in order to prevent them from
recommitting sexual crimes”).  The Act “is retributive in that it looks back at the offense (and
nothing else) in imposing its restrictions, and it marks registrants as ones who cannot be fully
admitted into the community.” See Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 704.  Additionally, the Act would, at
least, “serve[] the purpose of general deterrence.” See id.  However, as the Sixth Circuit noted,
“many of these goals can also rightly be described as civil and regulatory.” Id.  Thus, this factor
should be given little weight as to whether SORA is punitive. See id.
d. Rational Relation To A Non-Punitive Purpose
On  whether  SORA  has  a  rational  relation  to  a  non-punitive  purpose,  the  United  States
Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe described this factor as a “‘[m]ost significant’ factor in our
determination that the statute’s effects are not punitive.” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 102 (quoting
United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996)).  The express legislative purpose of the Act is
“to assist efforts of local law enforcement agencies to protect communities by requiring sexual
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offenders to register with local law enforcement agencies to make certain information about
sexual offenders available to the public . . . .”  I.C. § 18-8302.
However, the empirical studies presented to the Sixth Circuit in Does #1-5 cast
significant doubt on the level of risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders, and on whether sex
offender registration laws like SORA actually protect society. See Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 704-
05.  The Does #1-5 Court  noted,  “[o]ne  study  suggests  that  sex  offenders  (a  category  that
includes a great diversity of criminals, not just pedophiles), are actually less likely to recidivate
that other sorts of criminals.” Id. at 704 (citing Lawrence A. Greenfield, Recidivism of Sex
Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 (2003)).
The Sixth Circuit also stated, “[e]ven more troubling is evidence in the record supporting
a finding that offense-based public registration has, at best, no impact on recidivism.” Id.  “In
fact, one statistical analysis in the record concluded that laws such as [the Michigan act] actually
increase the risk of recidivism, probably because they exacerbate risk factors for recidivism by
making it hard for registrants to get and keep a job, find housing, and reintegrate into their
communities.” Id. at 704-05 (citing J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & Econ. 161, 161
(2011)).  The Sixth Circuit further related that nothing presented in the record in Does #1-5
“suggests that the residential restrictions have any beneficial effect on recidivism rates.” Id. at
705.  Additionally, the Does #1-5 Court faulted the Michigan act for making “no provision for
individualized assessments of proclivities or dangerousness. . . .” Id.
This Court should adopt the conclusions of the Sixth Circuit in Does #1-5 on the rational
relation to a non-punitive purpose factor, considering those conclusions are soundly based on
empirical studies. See id. at 704-05; cf. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 593 (2013) (“The New
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Jersey Supreme Court recently undertook a very thorough examination of the current state of
scientific research regarding eyewitness identification . . . . We agree with the New Jersey
Supreme Court and find that this extensive research convincingly demonstrates the fallibility of
eyewitness identification testimony and pinpoints an array of variables that are most likely to
lead to a mistaken identification.”).
Those  empirical  studies  indicate  that,  at  best,  the  efficacy  of  statutes  such  as  SORA  is
unclear. See Does #1-5, 834 F.3d at 705. At worst, statutes like the Act actually increase the risk
of recidivism, thus making our communities less safe. See id. at 704-05.  It cannot be said that
the Act is rationally related to the non-punitive purpose of protecting our communities.  Thus,
unlike in Smith v. Doe, see 538 U.S. at 102, this factor weighs in favor of the Act being punitive.
e. Excessiveness
On whether SORA is excessive with respect to its non-punitive purpose, like the
Michigan act in Does #1-5, “the negative effects are plain on the law’s face.” See Does #1-5,
834 F.3d at 705.  The Sixth Circuit concluded the Michigan act “puts significant restrictions on
where registrants can live, work, and ‘loiter,’ but the parties point to no evidence in the record
that the difficulties the statute imposes on registrants are counterbalanced by any positive
effects.” Id.  The  many  similarities  between  the  Michigan  act  and  SORA  in  its  current  form
indicate the Act likewise suffers from a lack of any positive effects.  Further, “[t]he requirement
that registrants make frequent, in-person appearances before law enforcement . . . appears to
have no relationship to public safety at all.” See id.  As the Sixth Circuit decided regarding the
Michigan act, the punitive effects of the Act’s restrictions “far exceed even a generous
assessment of their salutary effects.” See id.
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In sum, just as the Sixth Circuit and many other courts have held regarding similar sex
offender registry statutes, the actual effect of Idaho’s current SORA is punitive. See id.
Mr. Kinney submits that he has shown by the “clearest proof” that the Act in fact inflicts
punishment. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. at 92.  In light of the changes to SORA since 1999 that
have made it punitive, Smith v. State, Joslin, and Ray are manifestly wrong and should
be overturned.
2. The Punishment Imposed By SORA Is Cruel And Unusual
Having shown SORA is punitive, Mr. Kinney asserts the punishment imposed by the Act
in his case is cruel and unusual.  The first part of the cruel and unusual punishment inquiry, as
explained above, is for the Court to “make a threshold comparison of the crime committed and
the sentence imposed to determine whether the sentence leads to an inference of gross
disproportionality.” Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Where no
inference of a gross disproportionality can be made, there is no necessity to make any further
proportionality review.” Id. (internal  quotation  marks  omitted).   “However,  if  an  inference  of
such disproportionality is found, the Court must conduct a proportionality analysis comparing
the defendant’s sentence to those imposed on other defendants for similar offenses.” Id.
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
a. The Punishment Imposed By SORA Is Grossly Disproportionate
Mr. Kinney submits the punishment imposed by SORA on him is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of his offense.  Here, Mr. Kinney was charged with sexual
battery, on account of having had sexual relations with B.P.B.  (See R., p.68.)  During the trial,
B.P.B. testified she had sexual intercourse with Mr. Kinney about thirty to thirty-nine times.
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(See Tr. Aug. 16, 2016, p.69, Ls.14-25.)  Officer Cannon testified that after he confronted
Mr. Kinney with the text messages, Mr. Kinney ultimately estimated he had sexual intercourse
with B.P.B. more than ten times.  (See Tr. Aug. 16, 2016, p.102, L.11 – p.103, L.4.)  While some
of the text messages Mr. Kinney sent to B.P.B. could be described as coercive (see Presentence
Report (hereinafter, PSI, pp.6-12)),5 she did not testify Mr. Kinney ever used physical force on
her (see generally Tr. Aug. 16, 2016, p.64, L.12 – p.81, L.11).
The presentence report explained the context of Mr. Kinney’s relationship with B.P.B.
was that while Mr. Kinney was “recovering from his recent divorce, being kicked out of his
mother’s house and the loss of his children, he found a coworker who showed an interest in his
military  service  and  would  listen  to  him.”   (See PSI, p.54.)  Although the presentence
investigator wrote Mr. Kinney displayed impulsivity, lack of remorse, exploitive motivations,
and controlling behavior in his relationship with B.P.B. (see PSI, p.54), the presentence report
also stated the instant offense is his first felony conviction (PSI, pp.44, 54).
In a letter attached to the presentence report, Mr. Kinney’s great-aunt, Darlene Carr,
stated Mr. Kinney had been oxygen-deprived during his birth, suffered a degree of brain damage,
and had had learning difficulties throughout his life.  (PSI, pp.104-05.)  At the sentencing
hearing, Mr. Kinney’s mother, Tamara Norlander, stated that while her son “is a very kind
person, he’s not the brightest.”  (Tr. Nov. 23, 2016, p.9, Ls.16-20.)  Ms. Norlander also told the
district court Mr. Kinney had left the military only because he made a mistake with his time to
reenlist.  (See Tr. Nov. 23, 2016, p.9, L.25 – p.10, L.5.)  Ms. Norlander indicated Mr. Kinney’s
mental age was not equivalent to his physical age, and at the time of his relationship with B.P.B.,
5 All citations to the PSI refer to the 105-page PDF version of the Presentence Report
and attachments.
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he was struggling with “[l]osing everything with the military and his wife and trying to deal and
find his place in civilian life.”  (See Tr. Nov. 23, 2016, p.14, L.21 – p.15, L.8.)  She stated her
son “was very lonely and vulnerable.”  (Tr. Nov. 23, 2016, p.15, L.9.)  According to
Ms. Norlander,  “the weight of this crime is really hard for me to,  you know, think that he was
vulnerable and there was one person that held out their hand to him and he accepted it, and that
makes it really hard, and I have a hard time with it, but I know the law is the law, and that’s why
we’re here.”  (Tr. Nov. 23, 2016, p.16, L.24 – p.17, L.4.)
The punishment imposed by SORA is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the above
offense.  The Act would impose significant restrictions on where Mr. Kinney may live, work,
and even loiter. See, e.g., §§ 18-8307(5), 18-8309, 18-8327 and 18-8329.  He would be forced to
register for at least ten years, if not for life. See I.C. § 18-8310(1).  As Mr. Kinney asserted
before the district court, registering as a sex offender would mean he would lose “access to
employment,  housing,  and  association.”   (See R.,  p.74.)   In  the  words  of  the  Sixth  Circuit,
Mr. Kinney would be branded as a “moral leper[] solely on the basis of a prior conviction,”
consigned “to years, if not a lifetime, of existence on the margins . . . .” See Does #1-5, 834 F.3d
at 705.  Considering his lack of a prior record, his non-use of physical force, his mental faculties,
and his vulnerability at the time the relationship with B.P.B. started, the punishment imposed by
the Act on Mr. Kinney is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense.
b. A Proportionality Analysis Comparing Mr. Kinney’s Punishment Imposed
By SORA To Those Imposed On Other Defendants For Similar Offenses
Confirms His Punishment Is Grossly Disproportionate
Because Mr. Kinney has established an inference of gross disproportionality, the Court
must “conduct a proportionality analysis comparing the defendant’s sentence to those imposed
on other defendants for similar offenses.” See Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 486.  Mr. Kinney submits
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this proportionality analysis confirms his punishment imposed by SORA is
grossly disproportionate.
A comparison of Mr. Kinney’s punishment with possible punishments in other
jurisdictions indicates his punishment is grossly disproportionate.  As Mr. Kinney noted before
the district court, “[o]nly eighteen of the fifty states would call what is written in the information
in this case a crime.”  (See R., p.72.)  In some states, the offense at issue here would only be a
misdemeanor.   (See R.,  p.72.)   Further,  Mr.  Kinney  asserted  the  age  of  consent  in  many
European countries is sixteen.  (See R., p.73.)  That also suggests Mr. Kinney’s punishment for
having sexual relations with a sixteen-year-old minor is grossly disproportionate.
Additionally, Mr. Kinney referenced the letter from the special concurrence in Joslin,  a
case from Idaho.  (See R., p.72.)  In Joslin, the defendant had sexual intercourse with a sixteen-
year-old minor when he was nineteen. Joslin, 145 Idaho at 78.  The defendant was found guilty
of statutory rape after a jury trial. Id.
Justice Jim Jones wrote in the Joslin special concurrence that, “following the verdict and
prior to sentencing, nine of the jurors wrote to the sentencing judge to express sympathy for the
Defendant and to request leniency in his sentence.” Id. at 86 (J. Jones, J., specially concurring).
One of the letters, signed by seven jurors, stated those jurors understood the defendant “will be
labeled as a sex offender and this label will be placed on his record and will follow him for the
rest  of  his  life.   We do  not  believe  that  [the  defendant]  is  a  sex  offender  or  that  he  should  be
labeled as such.” Id.  The seven jurors also wrote, “[w]e are now aware of how the law reads,
how it defines statutory rape and the possible punishments that could be invoked.  We feel that
the law is antiquated and the letter of the law should not be applied in this case.” Id. at 86-87.
26
Mr. Kinney asserts the concerns of the seven Idaho jurors in the Joslin letter are applicable in his
case as well.
Thus, a proportionality analysis comparing Mr. Kinney’s punishment imposed by SORA
to those imposed on other defendants for similar offenses confirms his punishment is grossly
disproportionate.  Mr. Kinney asserts the punishment imposed by the Act in his case is therefore
cruel and unusual. See Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 486.  The district court’s orders denying
Mr. Kinney’s Motion to Dismiss on Proportionality Grounds and his Motion to Reconsider
Motion to Dismiss on Proportionality Grounds should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Kinney respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court’s orders denying his Motion to Dismiss on Proportionality Grounds and his Motion to
Reconsider Motion to Dismiss on Proportionality Grounds, and remand the case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 5th day of September, 2017.
___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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